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The Morgan "Power" and the Forced
Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions
Stephen L. Cartert
The Supreme Court's decisions on controversial issues invaria-
bly generate still greater controversy. Whatever romantic hopes
the Framers might have had for the institution and the fate of its
pronouncements, the reality is simple and somewhat sad: The
Court's judgments on emotionally searing questions of constitu-
tional law rarely settle them. Every celebrated decision seems to
bring a celebrated condemnation of its immorality and a cele-
brated demand that it be overturned. Because amending the Con-
stitution is practically impossible, altering federal court jurisdic-
tion too controversial, and appointing new Justices an option
rarely available, legislative circumvention and legislative override
have become the strategies of choice for those who are disap-
pointed with the Justices' conclusions.' The most provocative and
stimulating legislative proposals are often those possessing the
most dubious claims to constitutionality. Into this category fall all
those bills said to comprise exercises of the Morgan power.
The Morgan power derives its name and nearly all its rather
t Professor of Law, Yale University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a
meeting of the Yale Law School Faculty Workshop and my colleagues were, as usual, gener-
ous in their criticism. I have benefited in particular from more detailed comments by, criti-
cisms from, and discussions with Enola Aird, Akhil Amar, Boris Bittker, Lea Brilmayer,
Drew Days, Lucinda Finley, Geoffrey Hazard, and Burke Marshall, as well as from the re-
search assistance of Lynda-Susan Blake.
i Such efforts as jurisdiction-stripping and court-packing, even if adopted and even if
sustained, are crude methods of challenging the Court because they do not necessarily raise
direct challenges to the decisions that motivate them. In particular, removing the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court over specified classes of cases overturns no precedent. See Sager,
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Au-
thority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 40-42
(1981). Court-packing efforts, as Franklin Roosevelt learned, may well call into question the
legitimacy of the government seeking to impose them, and will certainly provide ammuni-
tion for one's political opponents. See WmLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND
THE NEW DEAL 232-39 (1963). Even those who, like President Reagan, are determined to
alter the Court's decisions prefer to await retirements rather than trying to increase the
number of Justices. Whatever tools Congress uses to express its disapproval of the Court's
doctrines, the stakes are high. See CHARLES BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-86 (1960)
(noting how judicial review promotes the legitimacy of the entire government).
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ethereal substance from the Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan.2 In that case, the Warren Court sustained the
constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a
provision essentially barring the enforcement of New York's Eng-
lish literacy requirement against otherwise qualified voters who are
educated in Puerto Rico.3 The result might have generated rela-
tively little controversy but for the Court's conclusion seven years
earlier in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections4
that literacy tests did not violate the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments absent some showing of discriminatory application.
Was the Congress tacitly asserting the forbidden power to revise
the Court's constitutional judgments by ordinary legislation? 5 Not
at all, the Court concluded. The congressional action, Justice Bren-
nan explained for the Morgan majority, was valid as an exercise of
its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enforce
the amendment's provisions by "appropriate legislation." The ma-
jority cautioned, however, that the Congress has the power only to
broaden the scope of fourteenth amendment rights, not to narrow
it.7
2 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
3 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1982).
4 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
6 One less obvious way in which section 4(e) altered the substantive rule of decision
established in Lassiter was by focusing on discriminatory effect rather than intent; there
was no claim that the New York law that the Congress sought to override was enacted for
any discriminatory purpose. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653-56. The Court has since made clear
that the Congress possesses the authority to make such a change. See City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
6 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653. Section 5 reads in its entirety- "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. Justice Brennan's footnote 10 does not expressly state
that the Congress has the power to "broaden" fourteenth amendment rights. However, that
is the implication of his statement that Congress may "enforce" but not "restrict, abrogate,
or dilute" those rights. Justice Brennan's approach is further discussed infra at notes 24-30
and accompanying text.
A less controversial basis for the decision in Morgan would have been to rely on the
plenary congressional authority over the territories of the United States, including Puerto
Rico. I am told by my colleague Burke Marshall, who headed the Civil Rights Division of
the Justice Department in the early sixties, that some Department lawyers urged that the
Voting Rights Act be grounded in this plenary authority rather than in section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. On this theory, the legislation would represent congressional protec-
tion of congressional prerogative: If the Congress has decreed that American citizens attend-
ing the Puerto Rican public schools shall be instructed in Spanish, then no state may
through its voting rules interfere with this determination. Cf. CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE
AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-13 (1969) (analogous argument concerning
state laws disenfranchising those in the armed forces). The Court in Morgan noted this
ground but did not consider it. 384 U.S. at 646 n.5.
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Morgan had its challengers from the day it was decided, but
its interpretation of section 5 is so consonant with the dominant
liberal ideal of a dynamic society evolving toward justice8 that, un-
til recently, its critics were not taken seriously.9 In fact, Morgan
itself was neglected for years. Since 1965, only a handful of opin-
ions have discussed the Morgan power.10 Outside the voting rights
field in which the doctrine originated,11 a majority of the Court has
never again relied on Morgan in reaching a decision-perhaps be-
cause the Congress has not often relied upon this power in legislat-
ing. So the Morgan power might have provided no more than a
curious footnote to constitutional theory, but for its resurrection in
the heated academic and political debate engendered by the Su-
preme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.12
Ever since the Court's ruling that the constitutional right to
privacy is at least in some circumstances broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's choice whether to end her pregnancy, a substantial
minority of the American public has sought to overturn or limit
the breadth of the decision. In 1981, a young lawyer named Ste-
phen Galebach wrote an article in the Human Life Review propos-
ing that the Congress use its Morgan power to enact legislation
that would in practical effect reverse Roe v. Wade.' s Could the
s See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 107 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Human Rights] ("The Morgan case... clears the way for a vast expansion of congressional
legislation promoting human rights."). I mean by this and other textual references to "liber-
alism" the ideal of classical liberalism, see infra text accompanying notes 89-94, not neces-
sarily any aspect of the platform of the contemporary "liberal" political faction. For a more
detailed account of my vision of classical liberalism and its relation to judicial decisionmak-
ing, see Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary
Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 825-27, 865-70 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as Indeterminate Text].
I The reason may have been that would-be critics believed that the voting rights con-
troversies from which the Morgan power arose were "largely obsolete," and that the Con-
gress was unlikely to make further important use of the power. See Cohen, Congressional
Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 619-20 (1975).
"0 For cases outside the voting rights area, see, for example, Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731-33 (1982); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-77
(1980) (plurality opinion); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
373 (1978) (opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
11 For voting rights cases, see, for example, City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 176 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132-33 (1970) (Black, J.); id. at 141 (Doug-
las, J.); id. at 248 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.).
12 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Galebach, A Human Life Statute, 7 THE HUMAN LIFE REVIEw 3 (1981), reprinted in
The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
1986]
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Congress not, he asked, just as it had extended the voting rights of
some Americans through the Voting Rights Act, also extend the
rights of the fetus-rights that the Court acknowledged in Roe as
those that the state can sometimes protect?14
In the academic community, on Capitol Hill, and among rights
activists on both sides of the abortion debate, the Galebach propo-
sal ignited a firestorm of controversy. 15 A "Human Life Bill" on
the Galebach model was introduced in the Senate in 1981.16 Many
Hearings].
14 Id. at 210-22; see Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-65 (concluding that the state possesses a com-
pelling interest in protecting the potential life of a viable fetus).
lB The bill proposed by Mr. Galebach read as follows:
The Congress finds that present day scientific evidence indicates a significant like-
lihood that actual human life exists from conception.
Upon the basis of this finding, and in the exercise of the powers of the Congress,
including its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, the Congress hereby declares that for the purpose of enforcing
the obligation of the States under the Fourteenth Amendment not to deprive persons
of life without due process of law, human life shall be deemed to exist from conception,
without regard to race, age, health, defect, or condition of dependency; and for this
purpose "person" shall include all human life as defined herein.
Galebach, supra note 13, at 3. In this form, the proposal lacked explicit enforcement mea-
sures; it was simply a declaration of the Congress's findings and their constitutional signifi-
cance. Nonetheless, if enacted in this form, the proposal might have enabled the states to
forbid all abortions. Further, Mr. Galebach asserted in his article that the Congress has the
power under section 5 to do more than "act by declaration without further enforcement."
Id. at 25.
Although Mr. Galebach's article embraced the Morgan power, his testimony before the
Congress was somewhat more equivocal. There he argued that the Congress could constitu-
tionally enact declaratory legislation because it would be "merely exercising its prerogative
to inform the Court of its views." Hearings, supra note 13, at 200 (testimony of Stephen
Galebach).
As far as I am aware, proponents of the Human Life Bill make no claim that a state
legislature would possess similar powers of definition. See Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193
(D.R.I.), aff'd, 482 F.2d 156 (Ist Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974) (rejecting effort
by a state legislature to ban abortion through defining the point at which life begins).
16 S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 496 (1981). The Bill was approved in
1981 by a 3-2 vote of the subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, but it subsequently died in the 97th Congress. Similar legislation was intro-
duced in the 98th Congress. See S. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S90 (daily ed.
Jan. 26, 1983). In the 99th Congress, pro-life forces chose a new tack, trying to amend ex-
isting civil rights legislation to protect "unborn" or "preborn" children. See S. 46, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S19 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); H.R. 555, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
130 CONG. REc. H128 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1985). Many of the constitutional considerations
discussed in this article are common to all the proposals.
The original Human Life Bill went further than the Galebach proposal by including
section 2 which purports to strip the lower federal courts of jurisdiction to grant equitable
relief in some abortion cases. Article III probably permits legislation of this kind. See Amar,
A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65
B.U.L. REv. 205, 258 (1985); cf. Galebach, The Constitutionality of Withdrawal of Lower
Federal Court Jurisdiction in the Human Life Bill, in Hearings, supra note 13, at 235, 241
[53:819
The Morgan "Power"
pro-life politicians and activists endorsed it at once, but scholarly
comment (not all of it from pro-choice scholars) has been almost
uniformly critical. 17 The critics fall into two camps: those who be-
lieve the Bill is unconstitutional because it falls outside the proper
scope of the Morgan power, and those who believe the Bill is un-
constitutional because Katzenbach v. Morgan was wrongly
decided.
Scholars who reject the Morgan power have the easier task.
But those scholars who would preserve the Morgan power and yet
reject the Galebach proposal face the difficulty of making a princi-
pled distinction between the Voting Rights Act and the Human
Life Bill. At first glance, their job seems easy. The Human Life
Bill, after all, appears to restrict a right that the Court has deemed
fundamental-an action that is plainly beyond the power of the
Congress. A close assessment of this and other arguments against
the Bill, however, suggests that the search for a definition of the
Morgan power that excludes the Human Life Bill is more hazard-
ous than it appears, proceeding down uncertain paths thick with
question-begging snarls, deadly weeds of indeterminacy, and other
traps for the unwary.
My purpose in undertaking this assessment is not to express a
view on the constitutionality of the Human Life Bill itself, and cer-
(asserting constitutionality of section 2). Because of the Supreme Court's often bizarre insis-
tence on analyzing legislative motivation, however, section 2 might be vulnerable to consti-
tutional challenge on the ground that it arises from hostility to a fundamental right. See
Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal
Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129 (1981).
In this article I am not concerned with section 2. Rather I address what advocates of
the Bill admit to be the full implications of section 1 under the Morgan power. When gener-
ally discussing "the Human Life Bill," I mean to include all varieties of legislation other
than constitutional amendment that would challenge Roe through a declaration on the "per-
sonhood" of the fetus.
17 For particularly scathing scholarly critiques, see Cox, Congress v. The Supreme
Court, 33 MERCER L. REV. 707 (1982) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court]; Emerson,
The Power of Congress to Change Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court: The
Human Life Bill, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 129 (1982); Estreicher, Congressional Power and Consti-
tutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REv. 333
(1982). In addition, the overwhelming majority of legal scholars who testified against the bill
were critical of the Galebach analysis. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 13, at 242-56 (testi-
mony and prepared statement of Laurence Tribe); id., Appendix Volume, at .793-808 [here-
inafter cited as Appendix to Hearings] (memorandum of R. Lea Brilmayer); id. at 824-25
(letter of Norman Dorsen). Prominent opponents of the Galebach proposal have included
several scholars who believe that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided. See, e.g., Hearings,
supra note 13, at 308-16 (testimony and prepared statement of Robert Bork); id. at 195-97
(letter of Charles Alan Wright). A few constitutional scholars testified that the legislation
was probably constitutional. See, e.g., id. at 256-75 (testimony and prepared statement of
John T. Noonan); id. at 317-27 (testimony and prepared statement of Robert Nagel).
1986]
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tainly not to support or to oppose its passage. Rather, I hope to
use a critique of the debate over the Human Life Bill to criticize a
form of argument that has become shockingly common in these
days since the constitutional deluge: adopting the deceptively neu-
tral-sounding phrases of constitutional law as a way of avoiding the
need to discuss tougher questions of morality and justice. Consti-
tutional theory, I will contend, must do more than serve as an in-
strument for achieving political goals. All too often, the justifica-
tions for Morgan offered in the debate over the proposed Human
Life Bill are purely instrumental-they are chosen in order to
reach the desired result and are only then cast as positive struc-
tural constitutional law. As a consequence, they are simply not
good theory.
My claim is not that Katzenbach v. Morgan was wrongly de-
cided or that the Human Life Bill would necessarily pass constitu-
tional muster. A convincing analysis of these propositions, how-
ever, ought to follow an approach markedly different from the
mainstream arguments in favor of the Morgan power. A richer and
more coherent approach, one I sketch lightly at the end of this
paper, would be to abandon the effort to demonstrate the flat un-
constitutionality of the Human Life Bill, and to focus instead on
locating congressional action under the Morgan power within a
continuing dialogue among the Justices and their various constitu-
encies. The Morgan power, I argue, is best understood as a tool
that permits the Congress to use its power to enact ordinary legis-
lation to engage the Court in a dialogue about our fundamental
rights, thereby "forcing" the Justices to take a fresh look at their
own judgments. Congressional exercises of the Morgan power thus
play an important role in the moral evolution of society-and are
most effectively opposed on moral grounds.
I. LOCATING THE Morgan POWER
The Morgan principle is deceptively pleasant. One of the pop-
ular justifications for what is sometimes called noninterpretive or
nontextual judicial review is that when Congress falters in the
march toward a just society, then the courts can (and ought to)
step in and fill the breach. 8 Katzenbach v. Morgan stands for
what must have seemed at the time of the decision to be the miss-
IS An impassioned, although much-criticized, statement of this view is MICHAEL PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). Professor Perry's views have
evolved since the publication of his book. See Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and
Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551 (1985).
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ing link to the promise of a better future through law: When the
courts falter in the march toward a just society, the Congress can
step in and fill the breach. If both propositions are simultaneously
true, then the American constitutional process promotes social pro-
gress in a wonderfully symbiotic way: The Congress moves for-
ward, then falters, the courts take the lead for a time, then they
falter, the Congress takes over until the courts are rested, then the
courts again resume leading, and so on. The cycle seems one of
unending (if slightly monotonous) forward motion, one in which
the judgment on what constitutes progress can be made equally by
either actor, and one in which neither actor can slow the march.
But the manner in which I have stated this vision of progress
holds a clue to the analytical difficulties the Morgan decision has
spawned: Like so much received constitutional doctrine, it lacks
substantive standards. How does an observer judge when the
movement is in the proper direction? After all, although the Su-
preme Court has led the way in banishing organized prayer from
the public schools,19 most Americans think the Justices are
wrong.20 And while the Congress has consistently worked to limit
pregnant women's access to abortions,21 most Americans think the
Congress is wrong.2  Who is moving toward a just society? Who is
'9 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (banning spoken state-composed prayer);
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (banning spoken prayer taken from
religious works); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (banning words of prayer hanging on
wall); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (banning moment of silence "for meditation
or voluntary prayer").
20 As recently as 1983, some 81% of those respondents who said they were aware of the
proposed constitutional amendment to permit voluntary organized prayer in the public
school classroom stated that they were in favor of it. The Gallup Report, No. 217, at 17-19
(Oct. 1983). Since 82% of all respondents knew of the amendment, very nearly two-thirds of
the American public probably favors it.
2' See Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1980), sustained in Har-
ris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
2 The American public has long been ambivalent about abortion, condemning it in
some situations but consistently and overwhelmingly opposing an outright ban on the prac-
tice in all circumstances. Thus a recent CBS News/New York Times poll found that while
55% of respondents considered abortion the same as the murder of a child, two-thirds of
those polled believed that abortion was sometimes the best solution to a difficult problem.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, at 22E, col. 4. A number of careful surveys have found substan-
tial public support for the right to choose abortion in cases involving life or health, but far
smaller support, sometimes less than a majority, when the woman seeks abortion because
she cannot afford any more children or because she simply does not want a child. See, e.g.,
KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 224-26 (1984); Jackson & Vi-
novskis, Public Opinion, Elections, and the "Single-Issue" Issue, in THE ABORTION DISPUTE
AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 64, 65 (G. Steiner ed. 1983) (analyzing survey results). As Dr.
Luker points out, support for abortion, including abortion on demand, increased throughout
the 1970s and into the early 1980s. See K LUKER, supra, at 225. Although in recent years
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faltering? The envisaged symbiotic relationship cannot by itself
provide answers to these questions.
No other vision, however, can fully explain the reasoning of
the Morgan majority. In fact, in the absence of a substantive the-
ory of progress, Morgan is a difficult decision to justify. Section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, the provision sustained in Morgan,
can fairly be described as a congressional effort to overturn a con-
stitutional decision of the Supreme Court. Unfortunately for the
advocates of progress by any means, the evolution of our legal sys-
tem has carried us past the point (if one ever existed) at which the
Congress might reasonably have claimed a general authority to re-
vise the Court's decisions through ordinary legislation. Unless a co-
herent limiting principle is established, the Morgan decision thus
appears quite destructive of constitutional tradition.
One might, of course, try to avoid the need for principle by
taking the easy way out. Perhaps the Congress, when acting under
the Morgan power, is not disagreeing with the Court on what the
Constitution requires. Plainly, to say that the Congress may grant
the right is not to say that the right itself will thenceforth be of
constitutional dimension. An exercise of the Morgan power may be
no different from the enactment of any statute meant to grant a
petitioner something she did not previously possess. Section 5 can
simply be seen as a grant of power to the Congress to enact civil
rights legislation, just as the Congress has power under the com-
merce clause to enact social welfare, telecommunication, or urban
development legislation. Just as in these other areas, legislation
under section 5 should be presumed valid unless a complainant can
show that it impairs some constitutional right. In fact, to say that
the congressionally granted right is valid only if no constitutional
right is restricted-a popular formulation of the Morgan power-is
in effect to deny the constitutional dimension of congressional ac-
tion pursuant to the power. After all, when two constitutional
that support has fallen off somewhat, 40% of respondents in the CBS News/New York
Times poll just mentioned would keep abortion a private decision for every woman. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, at 22E, col. 4.
Men are far more likely than women to support broad abortion rights. See id. Catharine
MacKinnon has explained this phenomenon by suggesting that a male-dominated society
permits abortion primarily to facilitate the heterosexual availability of women. See MacKin-
non, The Male Ideology of Privacy: A Feminist Perspective on the Right to Abortion, in
RADICAL AMERICA 23 (1983). Another possibility is that men, because their dialogue empha-
sizes competing and (for them) relatively abstract claims of right, may find the problem
easier to resolve than will many women, who might instead find in the abortion dilemma a
more personal conflict of responsibilities. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 70-105
(1982).
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rights are in conflict, the typical judicial response is to balance
them, not to declare one wholly invalid.2"
Yet matters cannot possibly be so simple. All the shouting af-
ter Katzenbach v. Morgan was plainly about something. The
"something" must be that the language of section 5 gives the Con-
gress a power to "enforce" the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment, whereas the Voting Rights Act arguably required the
exercise of a plenary power to protect against state interference
rights not embodied in those guarantees. Because the Congress
possesses no general regulatory authority over nonfederal elections,
however, section 5 is the only possible source of that plenary au-
thority. Thus the separation of powers inquiry: How can the Con-
gress claim to be enforcing the fourteenth amendment by creating
a right in potential voters not to be subjected to what the amend-
ment does not by its own force prohibit?
Justice Brennan, recognizing this difficulty, sought in his opin-
ion for the Court in Morgan to provide a limiting principle. He
articulated what appears to be a three-part test. To be a valid ex-
ercise of the Congress's power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment "to exercise its discretion in determining whether and
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the four-
teenth amendment, '24 the proposed legislation must (1) be "an en-
actment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause," (2) be "'plainly
adapted to that end,'" and (3) not be "prohibited by" but instead
be "consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the Constitution.' "25
That test by its own terms would probably outlaw very little.
It designedly mirrors the test for determining whether legislation
comports with the necessary and proper clause 26-a test containing
no bite whatsoever.21 Plainly aware of the danger in granting the
'3 For this reason, Robert Bork, in his testimony opposing the Human Life Bill,
presented the fascinating argument that even if enacted and even if constitutional, the Bill
would not necessarily alter the Roe result. Instead, he suggested, the Court would be called
upon to balance the fetus's right to life against the pregnant woman's right to privacy, and
the result of the balancing might be a "constitutional law of abortions" virtually identical to
the rules announced in Roe. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 309. Stephen Galebach insisted
in his testimony that the Bill does not deny the existence of the woman's privacy right, and
that the balance would still be struck by the Court. Id. at 200 (testimony of Stephen
Galebach).
" 384 U.S. at 651.
25 Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
26 "The Congress shall have Power.. . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
.7 At least two writers have tried to use.the necessary and proper clause to explain and
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Congress a plenary authority under section 5, but nevertheless de-
termined to walk the tightrope of permitting the Court to sustain
this provision of the Voting Rights Act while reserving the right to
invalidate other legislation under section 5, Justice Brennan quali-
fied the test in his controversial footnote 10:
We emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amend-
ment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or
dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment au-
thorizing the States to establish racially segregated systems of
education would not be. . . a measure "to enforce" the Equal
Protection Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits
such state laws.28
These dicta constitute the real Morgan "test," because this foot-
note is the only part of the opinion dealing with what the Congress
cannot do. The congressional initiative at issue must "enforce"
rather than "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" the guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment.
Even armed with this footnote, however, it is no easy task to
try to state a single, coherent rule for distinguishing between
proper and improper exercises of the Morgan power. Legal scholars
have tried for twenty years to explain how an interpreter can tell
whether the Congress is enforcing a constitutional guarantee or re-
stricting it,2 9 and how the congressional power can logically be lim-
limit the Morgan power. See Buchanan, Katzenbach v. Morgan and Congressional Enforce-
ment Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment: A Study in Conceptual Confusion, 17
Hous. L. Rav. 69, 116-17 (1979); Note, Toward Limits on Congressional Enforcement Power
Under the Civil War Amendments, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 453 (1982). Both writers justify Section
4(e) on the ground that it meets the "test" articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), to judge whether legislation is authorized under the necessary and
proper clause. The Reconstruction Congress that drafted the fourteenth amendment, how-
ever, considered and rejected the insertion of an analogue to that clause rather than the
current language of section 5. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 659 n.9; Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1, 29-40 (1955).
Nor does the language of McCulloch itself support the argument. Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion for the Court set out no "test" to determine whether legislation was author-
ized by the Clause. Instead, responding to one not very clever argument by counsel for the
state of Maryland, he explained why the clause did not forbid the congressional action. He
did not claim that the clause was itself the font of any congressional power. See C. BLACK,
supra note 7, at 13-14. As to my own earlier views on broad analogies that might be drawn
to the necessary and proper clause, see Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power:
Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1341, 1377-84 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Judicial Power], I confess error.
28 384 U.S. at 651-52 n.10.
29 See, e.g., Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L.
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ited to revision in only one direction.30 As will be seen, the effort
has not yet succeeded. More difficult still-and here is the conun-
drum presented by the instant debate-is the crafting of a rela-
tively neutral rule that recognizes section 4(e) of the Voting Rights
Act as a constitutionally legitimate exercise of this power, while
plainly excluding the Human Life Bill from its ambit. Yet a neu-
tral rule is what the Bill's academic critics must find, for they seek
to convince the Congress that the constitutionality of the proposal
turns not on one's views about whether abortion should be a mat-
ter for individual choice, but rather on the dire implications for the
separation of powers that would follow upon a legislative effort at
restricting the rights conferred by (any!) Supreme Court decision.
The mainstream case against the Human Life Bill is quite
straightforward. As one critic has put it, the Bill, if adopted and if
constitutional, would "alter radically the basic separation of pow-
ers between the legislative and judicial branches of the national
government as well as the boundaries between federal and state
political activity.""1 After all, the Supreme Court has ruled in quite
clear and unequivocal terms that the right to privacy in some cir-
cumstances includes the decision whether to end a pregnancy, and
the Human Life Bill is aimed at taking that decision out of the
pregnant woman's hands. Viewed in this way, the Bill is flatly in-
consistent with what the Court has stated to be constitutional law,
and is thus manifestly unconstitutional.
Had Katzenbach v. Morgan never been decided, and had Roe
v. Wade held what the Bill's opponents say it did, this would be
the beginning and the end of the matter. But Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan has been decided, and decided in a way that, when read in
tandem with what the majority actually said in Roe v. Wade, ought
to give pause to those who find the unconstitutionality of the
Human Life Bill a simple matter. For Katzenbach v. Morgan, too,
could easily be excoriated in terms much like those used in attack-
REv. 199, 251-52 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Determinations] (discussing
ambiguity of legislation seeking to modify Miranda); Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Sta-
tus of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HAv. L. REv. 1212, 1231 (1978) (discussing
the problem that by enforcing one right, Congress might intrude on another).
30 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9, at 606-07; Sager, supra note 29, at 1231-32; see also
Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra note 29, at 247-57 (questioning the need for
such a limitation).
31 Segers, Can Congress Settle the Abortion Issue?, Hastings Center Report, June,
1982, at 20 (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); see also MK PERRY, supra
note 18, at 135 ("Were Congress to be conceded the power to reverse [Roe v. Wade], we
would come to view the Court. . .as a sort of delegate of Congress, much as a court in its
common-law role is a delegate of the legislature.").
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ing the Human Life Bill. But it isn't. Although Morgan has its crit-
ics, it is widely admired and generally applauded. Therein lies the
conundrum. Unless the admiration and applause are directed to-
ward the result, not toward the analysis, the Human Life Bill is
not so easily distinguished. And if what is liked about Morgan is
the result, then the result of the Human Life Bill-not its implica-
tions for the separation of powers-is what the debate ought to be
about.
II. LIMITING THE Morgan POWER
A. Expansion Versus Dilution of Rights
Justice Brennan's footnote 10 in Morgan, his gloss on that
original footnote in his separate opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, 32
and a significant proportion of the scholarship on the Morgan
power share a common vision: Something about the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment grants to the Congress the au-
thority to make substantive adjustments that expand the scope of
rights secured by the fourteenth amendment. The initial definition
of those rights might be made by the Supreme Court, but the Con-
gress-whether because of its special fact-finding competence,33
because of its unique institutional role in securing individual lib-
erty against state oppression, 4 or for some other reason-can give
the force of law to its disagreement with the Justices. Clever lan-
guage aside, this is what the majority in Morgan seems to have
said, and this formulation has become popular wisdom.
But this formulation rests on two troubling presuppositions.
The first is that an observer can readily tell when the congressional
action is an expansion of rights. The second is that an expansion of
rights for one group will not contract the rights of another. The
32 400 U.S. 112, 229, 248 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Brennan, writing for himself and two other Justices, suggested that the Con-
gress might possess the authority to dilute rights found by the Justices if, in an exercise of
its special fact-finding competence, it "were to unearth new evidence." Id. at 249 n.31. He
was not of course writing for the Court, and in this paper I assume that the Human Life Bill
would have to meet the higher standard set in Morgan, not the peculiar gloss placed on the
section 5 power by Justice Brennan in Oregon v. Mitchell.
3 See Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra note 29, at 209-10, 225-26; Cox,
Human Rights, supra note 8, at 101-08. The deference to congressional fact-finding ability
was only implicit in Morgan. 384 U.S. at 653-58 (discussing probable factual basis for enact-
ment of § 4(e)). Justice Brennan made it explicit in his separate opinion in Oregon v. Mitch-
ell. 400 U.S. at 248, 249 n.31.
3' See Cohen, supra note 9, at 613-16. Professor Cohen's theory is analyzed in greater
detail infra at text accompanying notes 81-84.
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conception of a Morgan power that can be used only to expand
rights also raises a crucial question: Just what is so special about
the expansion of rights? Put otherwise, why establish a constitu-
tional rule that the Congress may overrule all fourteenth amend-
ment decisions except those extending rights to certain individuals
or groups?
The history of the fourteenth amendment is either so thin or
so negative that no one seriously presses the point that anyone
who wrote or ratified the amendment thought that section 5 would
grant to Congress any broad power to define the rights protected
by the amendment.3 5 And the language of section 5 gives less of a
clue than might be thought on whether the power, if it exists, can
move rights only in one direction. The congressional authority is to
"enforce . . . the provisions of this article." Once one concedes (or
contends) that the Congress's enforcement power under section 5
is not limited to the enactment of special procedures for the re-
dress of fourteenth amendment claims, logic alone can dictate no
compelling reason that enforcement cannot work in more than one
direction. 6 If the Court has the final word on the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, then to say that the Congress may never-
theless expand the scope of the amendment's protection beyond
the reach of the decided cases seems somewhat bizarre.
It ought to go without saying-although history has demon-
strated that it does not-that in our constitutional culture, all
branches of the government, both state and federal, are bound by
the construction placed on the Constitution by the Supreme Court.
Whether those who wrote and ratified the Constitution envisioned
a form of judicial review in which the courts would deliver consti-
tutional constructions that no one could defy without risking the
epithets of "fanatical" or "subversive" may be an interesting ques-
tion, but it is no longer an important one. The federal and state
governments are on notice and have concurred: The Court does
have the final say.3 7 Its interpretations of the document may be
disputed, but they cannot be overturned unless the Constitution is
amended or the Justices themselves reverse their decisions. 8 To
say that the fourteenth amendment grants to the Congress any au-
31 See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 79, 97; Bickel, supra note
27, at 29-40.
31 See Cohen, supra note 9, at 606-07; Sager, supra note 29, at 1231-32.
" See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 18-19 (1958).
" Of course, some decisions may simply pass into history, neither overruled nor fol-
lowed. See Carter, Indeterminate Text, supra note 8, at 852.
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thority whatsoever to alter the content of substantive constitu-
tional guarantees as construed and announced by the Justices is to
risk overturning this traditional rule.
Those who support Morgan and oppose the Human Life Bill
often seem to invoke and ignore the rule at the same time. The
rule is made a firm wall to ward off the Human Life Bill, but the
wall is weakened or even burst asunder to explain what the Court
did in sustaining section 4(e). There is, however, no basis in consti-
tutional language for ignoring the rule in the one case and extolling
it in the other. The congressional power is "to enforce." Creating a
right that the Court has denied is not "enforcement" of the Court's
interpretation; it is revision of that interpretation. So if the Con-
gress may nevertheless expand the provisions through interpreta-
tions of its own, then perhaps the Court does not have the final
word. If this is so, then why not permit the Congress to "enforce"
the fourteenth amendment by limiting the scope of judicial deci-
sions that have, in the judgment of the Members, gone beyond the
boundaries of what the amendment protects?
An intuitive response is that ceding to the Congress an author-
ity of such breadth just doesn't sound good. But if the power to
limit the scope of the Court's decisions doesn't sound good, then
perhaps a power to expand their reach should not sound good ei-
ther. If the latter sounds good and the former does not, the reason
surely has less to do with the language of section 5 or with the
structure of the federal government than it does with a value sys-
tem preferring expansion to contraction of rights and claiming the
ability to recognize each when it exists-the symbiotic ideal the
limitations of which I have already discussed.
Furthermore, in many instances-the Human Life Bill is only
one of them-an assertion by the Congress that a right is being
expanded might quickly be met by the petition of a citizen that
another right is being diluted. No mere statement that expansion
is good and dilution is bad can determine who ought to prevail.
The Court, in resolving the dispute, has no choice but to balance
the two claims of right one against the other before determining
which one should triumph. This, in essence if not in form, is the
way the Court proceeded in Runyon v. McCrary,"9 in which it re-
jected the claim that the free-association rights of students and
their parents provide a shield against the authority of the Congress
to reach private segregation academies. The Court seemed con-
3' 427 U.S. 160, 175-79 (1976) (evaluating constitutionality as applied).
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vinced not that no contrary right existed, but that one claim of
right was more worthy than the other.4" I certainly do not mean to
suggest that the Justices struck the wrong balance in McCrary-on
the contrary, I can scarcely conceive of a persuasive argument for
any other result-but the reason for my preference has far more to
do with my own moral universe than it does with some formal con-
ception of the distinction between the expansion and the dilution
of rights.
Three Justices seemed to acknowledge a similar tension in
Fullilove v. Klutznick,41 which sustained the authority of the Con-
gress to reserve for minority-owned enterprises a given proportion
of loans in support of government public works contracts. The
problem with the program is common to all racially conscious re-
medial measures: Plainly, such a "set-aside" provision reduces the
likelihood that any particular non-minority-owned entity will ob-
tain a loan, and that reduction is due entirely to the race of the
owner. In another context, the legislation might be said to be vio-
lating a fundamental right not to be denied a benefit-here, oppor-
tunity for participation in the entire program-because of one's
race.42 But the Morgan power, the plurality concluded, provides a
basis for a congressional conclusion that the set-aside provision is
necessary to redress peivasive discrimination in the awarding of
contracts.43 That is a perfectly plausible policy conclusion, but it is
also one that permits Congress to use its Morgan power not simply
to expand a right, but to determine that one right is superior to
another.
40 The same can be said of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 H Av. L. REv. 1, 34 (1959)
(suggesting that the Justices might have given inadequate weight in Brown to the free asso-
ciation rights of white citizens). But cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244,
3252 (1984) ("compelling state interests" outweigh the "right to associate for expressive
purposes").
41 448 U.S. 448, 484-85 (1980) (Burger, C.J., joined by White & Powell, JJ., announcing
the judgment of the Court).
42 Cf. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (suggesting that all ethnic
groups are protected by the equal protection clause); McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (holding that antidiscrimination law protects white persons as well as
black ones, and concluding that this was the intention of the Reconstruction Congress).
43 448 U.S. at 476-78 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); cf. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367-69 (1978) (joint opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.) (congressional authority under section 5 called broad enough to support ra-
cially conscious remedies in the face of arguments that fundamental rights are violated). Of
course in Fullilove, as in Morgan itself, see infra note 54, the Justices spoke of superior
congressional fact-finding ability even though the Congress apparently did not find any
facts. See Drew Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. (forthcoming).
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The same seems strikingly true of the decision in Morgan it-
self. The congressional judgment on whether literacy tests ought to
be permitted was the precise opposite of the judicial one, and yet
the statute was allowed to stand. The Justices defined the content
of the right involved in one way, the members of the Congress in
another. The Human Life Bill is usually distinguished, as I have
said, on the ground that it conflicts with the right found in Roe,
whereas the Voting Rights Act conflicted with no right established
by the Court. But this distinction is not based, except in a highly
formal way, on the separation of powers. The separation of powers
might require that the Congress do nothing inconsistent with the
decision of the Supreme Court. The distinction drawn by the Bill's
opponents, however, permits the Congress to act inconsistently
with the Court's rulings on constitutional meaning, provided that
the legislation does not dilute a right that the Court has found. If
this is not the distinction, then the Human Life Bill and the Vot-
ing Rights Act may have a common separation of powers problem,
for both involve a congressional definition of a right in a different
way than the Court has defined it. As long as the Morgan power is
understood to permit an adjustment in the scope of constitutional
rights as defined by the Court, the separation of powers difficulty
will remain.
B. Institutional Competence
Archibald Cox, a longtime defender of Morgan and an incisive
critic of the Human Life Bill, has sought to justify the Morgan
power through an argument, now widely accepted, couched in
terms of the relative competence of the courts and the Congress in
the determination and evaluation of facts.44 The decision, Profes-
sor Cox argues, "follows logically from the basic principles deter-
mining the respective functions of the legislative and judicial
branches. 4 5 "Whether a State law denies equal protection depends
to a large extent upon the finding and appraisal of the practical
importance of relevant facts. '46 Professor Cox would take the usual
4 The Reagan Administration, for example, has described the power in this fashion in
a 1982 letter to the Congress: "Congress may enact statutes to prevent or to remedy situa-
tions which, on the basis of legislative facts, Congress determines to be violative of the Con-
stitution"--provided always that "Fourteenth Amendment guarantees as recognized by the
Supreme Court" are not diluted or abridged. Letter from William French Smith, U.S. Attor-
ney General, to Peter W. Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, at 9 (May 6,
1982).
" Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra note 29, at 228.
" Id. at 228-29.
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judicial deference to legislative judgments of fact and apply it to
the fourteenth amendment setting as well, but with the added un-
derstanding that, under section 5, the Court is to prefer federal to
state legislative findings when the two conflict.47
According to Professor Cox, this deference to the fact-finding
competence of the legislative branch supports the conclusion that
the Congress generally may expand but not contract constitutional
rights declared by the Court.48 Using school segregation as an ex-
ample, he argues that congressional fact-finding is irrelevant once
the Supreme Court has decided that the fourteenth amendment of
its own force prohibits a state law.
Since the Court. . .will invalidate a State law only if no set
of facts which sustains the classification can reasonably be
supposed to exist, a decision finding that a State had denied
equal protection could not be reversed by Congress because,
by hypothesis, there could be no rational support for the con-
gressional conclusion that facts existed to sustain the
classification. 49
In short, the deference is due when findings of fact might make a
difference; it is improper when the Court has already determined
that they would not-a conclusion the Court is presumed to have
reached whenever it holds that state legislation conflicts with indi-
vidual rights.
This justification for the Morgan power, however, provides no
reliable boundary between proper and improper congressional acts.
The question whether a particular'decision turns on determina-
tions of fact is rarely a simple one. A constitutional fact is not re-
ally a fact at all, but a legal conclusion which is stated in a way
that makes it sound fact-like.8 0 Thus whether a corporation 51 or a
47 Id. at 229.
" But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 229 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring), dis-
cussed supra note 32.
19 Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra note 29, at 254; see also Gordon, The
Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to
Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. L. REv. 656, 671 (1977) (distinguishing
"absolute" from "contingent" decisions, on the basis of the relevance of legislative facts to
the decision).
50 Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 53 (1980) ("Broad questions of public
policy are likely to involve what are called, uncoincidentally, 'legislative facts,' or broad fac-
tual generalizations, as opposed to specific 'adjudicative facts.' "). A "constitutional fact"
may be defined simply as an "adjudicative fact" on which a constitutional decision turns.
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932). This distinction between legislative fact-
finding and "what can at most be called a legislative announcement that Congress believes a
state law to entail an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection" formed an important
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tree52 or a fetus is a person within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment is an issue of constitutional fact; whether that person
visited Monte Carlo last year is not. This distinction matters be-
cause, as even Professor Cox acknowledges, "the finding of facts"
often "cannot really be severed from their characterization or eval-
uation for legal purposes and. . . the latter process can hardly be
separated from striking a balance between opposing considerations
or resolving a question of degree. '53 This makes the border be-
tween fact-finding and lawmaking a difficult one to patrol.
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court that
decided Lassiter in 1959 in the midst of the most traumatic period
of the civil rights movement, the same Court that was waging a
war of attrition against racial segregation (including various forms
of voting discrimination), did not know what the Congress later
"found": that many states used literacy tests to deny the franchise
to their citizens. More important, the Congress arguably never
found any facts at all: Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act was a
floor amendment adopted without specific factual support in the
legislative record.4 Perhaps, then, the deference to Congress that
Professor Cox places at the core of the M6rgan power was not con-
stitutional principle, but judicial subterfuge, cloaking the value
choice that the time had come to do away with literacy tests.
Finally, Professor Cox's approach does not provide strong sup-
port for the conclusion that the Congress has significantly greater
power to expand than to dilute rights. 5 True, the Court may hy-
pothesize that no factual support for a state law can "reasonably
be supposed to exist. '56 But the Congress, using its superior fact-
finding ability, might find evidence that the Court did not believe
existed. Suppose that the Congress later finds facts that contra-
vene those underlying the judicial decision in question-for exam-
ple, the psychological evidence on which the Court (perhaps un-
part of the basis for the dissenting opinion in Morgan. 384 U.S. at 669 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
51 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 211 U.S. 361 (1911); Santa Clara County v. South-
ern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
82 Cf. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,
45 S. CAL. L. RE V. 450 (1972).
53 Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra note 29, at 234.
See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 669 & n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55 Professor Cox makes clear, however, that he is not committed at all costs to a "one-
way-only" version of the Morgan power. See Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra
note 28, at 255.
56 Id. at 254.
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wisely) rested its decision in Brown v. Board of Education.57
Arguably, the institutional competence of the Congress in finding
facts is such that its subsequent legislation overturning Brown's
view of the effects of segregation ought to be valid. 8 If this exam-
ple sounds troubling, then so should the next: Suppose that the
Congress had expressly found the facts later found by the Brown
Court and used them, much as the Court did, to justify a legisla-
tive overruling of Plessy v. Ferguson.9 Professor Cox's conception
of institutional competence provides no basis for distinguishing the
two examples. If the first example is troubling and the second is
not, the explanation must be the particular value system of the
interpreter, not any formal notion of the separation of powers.60
Although Professor Cox plainly does not believe that the
Human Life Bill is legislation of the sort that section 5 will sus-
tain,"1 his reliance on a deference to congressional competence in
fact-finding would probably make advocates of the Human Life
Bill quite happy. The constitutional right to an abortion, the Bill's
supporters contend, was established only because of the Court's
own concession that it was unable to tell when a human life be-
gins.6 2 Roe v. Wade, the proponents of the Bill insist, turns criti-
cally on the factual difficulty. If the Congress then uses its superior
fact-finding ability to determine the beginning point, does the
scope of the right to privacy not contract by its own force? 6 The
proponents of the Bill note that in Katzenbach v. Morgan and
67 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
58 At least one contemporaneous observer who believed Brown to be rightly decided
nevertheless was quite confident that the Congress possessed adequate authority under sec-
tion 5 to reverse the decision. See CHARLES CURTIS, LAW AS LARGE AS LIFE. A NATURAL LAW
FOR TODAY AND THE SUPREME COURT AS ITS PROPHET 116-17 (1959).
" 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
'0 The point is that the interpreter cannot, without crucial and direct reliance on a
comparative judgment on the desirability of the results, explain whether the legislative over-
ruling of Plessy would represent societal progress or whether it would constitute an unjusti-
fied contraction of the free association rights of pro-segregation whites. The fact that most
of us would find the value choice an easy one does not mean that no value choice is in-
volved. See also supra note 40.
s See Hearings, supra note 13, at 338-44 (prepared statement of Archibald Cox).
62 See Galebach, supra note 13, at 4-5; Hearings, supra note 13, at 264 (prepared state-
ment of John Noonan); id. at 924 (prepared statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
'3 The Roe majority seemed to think so. See 410 U.S. at 156-57 ("If this suggestion of
personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to
life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment."). But a strong argument can
be made to the contrary. See supra note 23; cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTI-
TUDES, AND THE LAW 110-14 (1985) (arguing that the logic of later cases suggests that Roe
turned on sexual equality rather than on the "personhood" of the fetus).
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach,6 4 the Court relied expressly on con-
gressional findings of fact to explain why the Congress could de-
clare literacy tests discriminatory even when the Court had not."5
The same ability to find facts, the Bill's supporters say, should
permit the Congress to alter the scope of the right to privacy
through redefining its factual predicates.
The critics usually dismiss this argument as frivolous, and ac-
cuse the proponents of the Human Life Bill of misreading (perhaps
intentionally) the Court's opinion. For example, in his testimony
opposing the Human Life Bill, Laurence Tribe disputed the notion
that Roe v. Wade rested in any important way on a supposed judi-
cial inability to tell when life begins. "[W]hat [the Court] really
meant," he concluded, "was that no State, by adopting its own an-
swer to that question .. could be permitted to override the fun-
damental right of the pregnant woman to give an answer for her-
self."6 That may be what the Court meant, but it isn't what the
Court said. Wishful thinking aside (for the Court could have writ-
ten the opinion quite differently than it did 67), it is Professor
Tribe, not the supporters of the Huinan Life Bill, who appears to
have misread the Court's opinion.
The statement in Roe to which he refers reads in its entirety
as follows: "In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting
one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant
woman that are at stake."68 The "all this" surely does not refer, as
Professor Tribe implies, to the pregnant woman's right to privacy,
because the statement would then become tautological: "In view of
the pregnant woman's rights . . . Texas may not override the
rights of the pregnant woman." Rather, the "all this" surely refers
to the lengthy discussion immediately preceding the quoted sen-
tence. That discussion concerns the inability of the Court to deter-
mine-and of society over time to reach consensus on-when
human life begins. It is because of this lack of consensus, this dis-
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
"' See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-56; South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 329-33.
66 Hearings, supra note 13, at 243 (statement of Laurence Tribe).
'7 See Carter, Roe v. Wade Left Both Sides Open to Science, Wall St. J., Aug. 21,
1985, at 24. For examples of different bases on which the Justices might have supported the
rights found in Roe, see Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1569 (1979);
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). The Supreme Court in Roe
explicitly declined to entertain the claim "that one has an unlimited right to do with one's
body as one pleases," 410 U.S. at 154, and the Justices have subsequently refused an invita-
tion to rest the right to abortion on some other ground, see Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
6 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (emphasis added).
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sension on a question that is essentially one of fact, that the state
may not override the pregnant woman's right to privacy. In fact,
the Court itself seemed to believe that if "personhood" were deter-
mined to begin at conception, the right to terminate a pregnancy
would vanish.69
"Personhood" within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment is of course a quintessentially constitutional fact, one that
the Court alone may finally decide. But the Court in Roe seemed
to base this determination on its answer to another question:
whether there existed consensus on the beginning point of human
life. This is not a constitutional inquiry. The Court's review of ef-
forts at defining humanity covered not constitutional decisions, but
legislative, professional, and societal judgments.7 0 No consensus
was found, but a consensus-not a constitutional rule-is what was
sought. The Justices might quite properly reserve to themselves
the decision on what weight a consensus should carry in the debate
over a constitutional right to end a pregnancy, should a consensus
be discovered or created. But the distinct inquiry on whether a
consensus exists at all quite plainly requires a factual investigation
of the sort that a legislature is infinitely more qualified than a
court to undertake. The Justices, not the proponents of the
Human Life Bill, introduced this nonconstitutional question into
the abortion controversy. Once introduced, however, it invites (al-
though it does not require) legislative solution. 1
Roe v. Wade simply is not like other controversial pronounce-
ments from the Supreme Court. Its language is far more tentative
and cautious than friends and enemies alike generally assert. The
frustrating uniqueness of Roe comes in part because no other ma-
jor constitutional decision of the Supreme Court rests so heavily on
a supposed judicial inability to discover a fact. But that inability is
only the predicate of the rule; it is not the rule itself. The Court, in
other words, has not stated that no one will ever be permitted to
determine when human life begins. It has not stated that no con-
sensus will ever develop on when human life begins. An opinion
reflecting that conclusion might be a bad one or a good one, but it
is not the opinion the Court wrote in Roe. The Court in Roe stated
" See supra note 63.
"' Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-52 (historical treatment of abortion); id. at 159-62 (historical
treatment of beginning of life).
7 See Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abor-
tion Controversy, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 107, 157 (1982) ("The Court's rhetoric in Roe v. Wade
makes the arguments for the Human Life Bill at least plausible.").
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only that it does not believe any consensus exists on when human
life begins. The legislative branch, whatever its weaknesses, is far
more sensitive to the emergence of a fresh consensus than the judi-
cial branch can ever be.72 So whether one views it as morally bank-
rupt or morally imperative, the Human Life Bill represents a per-
fectly logical effort to resolve the judicial conundrum. The
resolution may not be the correct one-indeed, the existence of a
potential consensus is dubious and the ideological coloring of the
legislation is plain-but it is difficult to see how the reasoning ac-
tually contained in Roe v. Wade forbids the Congress to try.73
Of course, even accepting the reading of Roe offered by propo-
nents of the Human Life Bill, it is not as clear as they claim that
the Bill is the product of a bona fide effort to resolve the factual
difficulty. My colleague Thomas Emerson, among others, has force-
fully contended that the question of when human life begins is one
not of "fact," but of "faith, religious dogma, or a fundamental
value at the basis of a philosophical system. '7 4 According to Pro-
fessor Cox, most of the Human Life Bill "does not even purport to
deal with the facts. 7 5 Indeed, it is difficult to resist the conclusion
that the "findings of fact" in the Human Life Bill are a subterfuge
71 "[W]e may grant until we're blue in the face that legislatures aren't wholly demo-
cratic, but that isn't going to make courts more democratic than legislatures." J. ELY, supra
note 50, at 67 (footnote omitted). Democratic or not, many members of the Congress evi-
dently believe they are detecting a developing consensus on fetal humanity. Even if they are
correct (and available survey evidence, see supra note 22, suggests that American attitudes
about abortion may be more ambivalent than many in the pro-life movement claim), how-
ever, supporters of the Human Life Bill and similar legislation should not ignore the distinc-
tion between legislative and constitutional facts. A consensus on whether abortion should be
permitted or not is largely irrelevant to the determination of constitutional right. Cf. Dwor-
kin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 516 (1981) (the Court should neither
"delegate" questions of whether "unborn infants are people" to the legislature nor "accept
whatever answer the legislature offers"). But a consensus on whether a fetus is human is
precisely what the Court said in Roe might point the decision in the opposite direction.
Given the fact that those who are pro-life are far more likely than those who are pro-choice
to be politically active, see Jackson & Vinovskis, supra note 22, at 68-70, and that more
than half the American public apparently considers the fetus to be a human being, see
supra note 22, those who support freedom of choice may yet have before them important
tasks of public education. See also K LUKER, supra note 22, at 236-43 (suggesting that the
pro-choice movement should not assume from its success so far that it faces no political
problems).
71 Thus the Congressional Research Service analysis of the Human Life Bill erred in
concluding: "The question of when life begins was not decided [in Roe] because it was irrel-
evant to the legal conclusion and not as a result of a judicially perceived lack of institutional
competence." M. ROSENBERG & K. LEwis, CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT A HUMAN
LIFE STATUTE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF S. 158, at 25 (1981).
74 Emerson, supra note 17, at 131.
75 Cox, The Supreme Court, supra note 17, at 711.
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for imposition of a value choice. 76
Yet attacking the Bill because its findings are inadequate
seems a poor substitute for argument on the merits. An attack of
this nature implicitly assumes that the Bill would be safe if only
the record were stronger. But I have already noted the weakness of
the proposition that section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act was sus-
tained because the Justices were impressed with the congressional
findings of fact: There weren't any! The only thing that can ex-
plain the preference for one subterfuge over another is the differ-
ent value choices involved: the Justices (and the scholars) consid-
ered the Voting Rights Act a good thing, and they would consider
the Human Life Bill a bad one. Argument over good and bad is a
legitimate form of political argument, but it has little to do with
the special fact-finding competence of Congress.
C. Remedies
Some critics have objected to the Human Life Bill-and have
tried to preserve Morgan itself-by arguing that Katzenbach v.
Morgan did not involve any alteration in the substantive content
of constitutional rights. Instead, the Court approved no more than
a congressional establishment of remedies for the violation of the
rights already found by the Court. 7 Those who make this argu-
ment are quite correct in contending that they have found a princi-
pled means of striking down the Human Life Bill. Their difficulty
is that they have found a principle that cannot explain Katzen-
bach v. Morgan.
Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act does not, on its face,
provide a remedy for violation of any constitutional right ever es-
tablished by the Supreme Court. It is not quite accurate to say
76 This is true in part because although the Bill purports to rest on scientific under-
standings, the concept of "humanity" may be more a social construct than a scientific one.
See, e.g., Grobstein, A Biological Perspective on the Origin of Human Life and Personhood,
in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE MEDicAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 3, 10 (M. Shaw & A.
Doudera eds. 1983) (biologist concludes that "the concept of person is only partly biologi-
cal"); Segers, supra note 31, at 21-22 (political scientist concludes that "human beings with
human purposes.., decide when to ascribe personhood"). But see Callahan, The Role of
Science in Moral and Societal Decision Making: The Human Life Bill as a Case Study, in
DEFINING HUMAN LIFE, supra, at 314, 318-21 (suggesting that society may define human life
in a way that renders the question susceptible to scientific judgment). See generally Carter,
The Bellman, the Snark, and the Biohazard Debate, 3 YALE LAW & POL. REV. 358 (1985)
(challenging presumption of deference to scientific expertise even on apparently scientific
questions).
7 See, e.g., Appendix to Hearings, supra note 17, at 824-25 (letter of Norman Dorsen);
id. at 868-69 (letter of Thomas Emerson).
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that Morgan (or Lassiter for that matter) involved protection or
extension of the right to vote; there is no such right available to be
protected or extended.7 8 Most frequently, the plaintiff in a "voting
rights" case will claim a violation of the right not to be the subject
of racial discrimination in voting. After Lassiter one might have
said that there was a general right not "to vote" but "to vote if you
are literate in English." To speak of protecting that right by.ex-
tending it to those not literate in English makes nonsense of the
Court's ruling. Something is indeed protected, but it is not the
same something that the Court has approved. 9
The answer to all this may be that the Congress through sec-
tion 4(e) essentially accepted the invitation that the Supreme
Court extended in Lassiter. "Prove to us that literacy tests are a
barrier, and they'll go," the Justices wrote in effect. "Here's the
proof," the Congress responded. On this model, the right to be vin-
dicated is the right to nondiscriminatory access to the franchise;
the ban on literacy tests is remedial because they serve to
discriminate.
But even if acceptable as a justification for the result in Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan, this model cannot easily serve to distinguish
the Human Life Bill. The Congress, after lengthy hearings and de-
tailed findings (be they good ones or not), would be announcing
the discovery of a societal consensus against treating the fetus as
less than a human being. "We're accepting your invitation," the
Congress would say once again-referring this time to the Roe
Court's search for just this consensus. "Here's the proof you need."
I have already noted that if the Justices can use the slender "find-
ings" supporting section 4(e) as a justification for deference, it is
not easy to see how they can ignore more detailed congressional
findings (whether they be right or wrong) following the extensive
hearings on the Human Life Bill.
1 See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (the
right to vote that is protected by § 2 of the fourteenth amendment is that established by
state law).
79 One might avoid this problem by arguing that the Voting Rights Act should never
have suspended all literacy tests, but only those actually used for a discriminatory purpose.
Although this proposition might be troubling to those who believe in universal adult suf-
frage, it is analogous to the view that civil rights laws protect individuals, not groups, and
that group remedies are therefore inappropriate-the position that the Reagan Administra-
tion has urged on the courts in discrimination cases. See Reynolds, Individualism v. Group
Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984). Of course, providing remedies on an
individual-as-victim model is at best a paradoxical solution to a historical pattern of dis-
crimination against individuals as representatives of groups. See Days, Turning Back the
Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309 (1984).
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To be sure, there is no formal reason that the Court could not
reject the findings, because "it is deference and not capitulation
which is espoused in Katzenbach."80 Apart from disputes about
the nature of the record, opponents of the Human Life Bill could
note in response to the analogy that the fetus can be assigned no
rights because the central thrust of Roe v. Wade is that the fetus is
not a person under the equal protection clause. But it is not easy
to shake the intuition that the argument that the Congress can ex-
pand remedies available only to those who are already persons
under the amendment is ultimately question-begging. If the Voting
Rights Act is deemed remedial and the Human Life Bill is not, the
likely reason is a value choice about the relative importance of the
claims of right in the two cases. Value choices may have a vital role
to play in public argument, sometimes even in constitutional argu-
ment, but theories requiring that they be made should not be
presented as though the theories are value-free. It simply is not
possible to use the argument from remedy to preserve section 4(e),
eliminate the Human Life Bill, and avoid discussion on the moral-
ity of abortion itself.
D. Federalism
Writing about ten years ago, William Cohen tested the leading
explanations for Katzenbach v. Morgan and found them wanting.
He developed a quite different theory to stand in their place:
A congressional judgment rejecting a judicial interpretation of
the due process or equal protection clauses-an interpretation
that had given the individual procedural or substantive pro-
tection from state and federal government alike-is entitled
to no more deference than the identical decision of a state leg-
islature. Congress is no more immune to momentary passions
of the majority than are the state legislatures. But a congres-
sional judgment resolving at the national level an issue that
could-without constitutional objection-be decided in the
same way at the state level, ought normally to be binding on
the courts, since Congress presumably reflects a balance be-
tween both national and state interests and hence is better
able to adjust such conflicts."1
80 Sager, supra note 29, at 1230.
" Cohen, supra note 9, at 614. In his letter opposing the Human Life Bill, Professor
Cohen pressed the more straightforward argument that the Congress simply lacks power to
diminish constitutional protections established by the Supreme Court. See Appendix to
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Thus it is the federalist nature of the constitutional system-not
the content of section 5 itself-that determines the validity of the
congressional action. As Professor Sager has pointed out, this the-
ory works only if the Court's interpretations of the equal protec-
tion clause are not "understood as exhausting the legal meaning of
the clause. '82 If they are, then whether or not the Congress has
competence superior to that of state legislatures, no fourteenth
amendment authority to readjust the substantive content of four-
teenth amendment rights emerges.
But even if we ignore this problem, we are faced once more
with the need to explain why the congressional power works only
in one direction. Professor Cohen resolves the problem by defining
it away. The ratchet, as he calls it, turns in only one direction,
because the special competence of the Congress only permits it to
determine "when decisions traditionally made at the state level
should be supplanted by national solutions." ' s3
Even if correct, his conclusion would pose less trouble than
might appear for advocates of the Human Life Bill. They could
argue that the fragmented understandings of the different states
on the question of when human life begins "should be supplanted
by national solutions" at last, thus either recognizing or calling
into existence the consensus the Court could not find. To be sure,
this argument would be open to challenge: Perhaps the congres-
sional judgment is wrong. But a refusal to defer to the congies-
sional findings places at risk Professor Cohen's entire theory, for a
Court could easily second-guess even the conclusion that suspen-
sion of literacy tests was necessary. In any case, Professor Cohen's
formulation lacks support in the language of section 5.84 Just as
the case against the Human Life Bill must be based on what the
Court actually said in Roe, and not on some more sophisticated
argument for the same result, so it should be based on what the
Justices have actually said about the powers of Congress, and not
on the different and perhaps more persuasive arguments they
Hearings, supra note 17, at 815.
' Sager, supra note 29, at 1237.
Cohen, supra note 9, at 613.
Professor Cohen's approach is, however, consistent with Jesse Choper's controversial
theory counseling judicial refusal to decide cases involving challenges to congressional exer-
cises of power that are purported to interfere with the sovereignty of the states, see JESSE
CHOPER, JUDiciAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL PoLrrcAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980), and perhaps
consonant as well with Herbert Wechsler's vision of the political safeguards of federalism,
see Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Com-
position and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
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might instead have made.
III. THE LIMITS OF THE DISCOURSE: A TRANSITIONAL MEDITATION
Up to this point I have played the game the way that those
who call the Human Life Bill unconstitutional seem to believe it
ought to be played: by close analysis of the Court's precedents and
an effort to apply that analysis to this debate. I say "seem to be-
lieve" because the weaknesses I have tried to identify in the argu-
ments against the Human Life Bill suggest that some wishful
thinking is interfering with dispassionate analysis. In many cases,
policy preferences may be masquerading as constitutional rules. I
propose that the analytical difficulties have arisen because the war
is being waged (by both sides) on the wrong battleground, that
perhaps trying to resolve a struggle over competing visions of
rights through the formalistic limitations implied by the separation
of powers is a doomed enterprise. Perhaps this is a case for pas-
sion, instead of pedagogical distance-as long as one means by pas-
sion something other than using subterfuge to fool our opponents
rather than change their minds.
I do not mean by this discussion to join the legion of critics
who contend that all our modern "rights talk" is essentially inco-
herent or presents issues incapable of resolution.85 That debate,
while possibly useful, is quite beside the point I am trying to make.
Rather, I only wish to suggest that the form of dialogue over rights
that has developed in our own legal culture, a form tying rights to
constitutional provisions and judicial precedents rather than to the
philosophical predilections of a transient Supreme Court majority,
is quite inadequate to find or create8" relatively determinate rules
for explaining simultaneously why Katzenbach v. Morgan was
85 This debate-at its core a debate about the relationships among law, morality, and
politics-is carried on both as part of the search for justifications for particular theories of
constitutional interpretation, compare M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, with
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981), and, at a more abstract remove, com-
pare RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) with ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS (1975). But the best and simplest statements of the view that moral argument
is essentially incoherent remain those of the late Arthur Leff. See Leff, Unspeakable Ethics,
Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229; Leff, Law and Technology: On Shoring Up a Void, 8
OTTAWA L. REv. 536 (1976).
8, All rules, whether created or discovered (in the Constitution or elsewhere), can serve
equally to constrain the exercise of power. See Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177,
186 (1986) (interpretive rules, even if already "contextualized" and interpreted, can still
"constrain the interpretation of another text (the Constitution)"); see also Carter, Indeter-
minate Text, supra note 8, at 853-65 (advocating creation of narrowing rules).
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rightly decided and why the Human Life Bill is unconstitutional.
One reason that the effort to prove both propositions is so dif-
ficult may be that so many of the arguments are essentially ad
hoc-that they are being developed for just that purpose. A strat-
egy less detrimental to the enterprise of constitutional theory
would be to first derive and defend the moral principle underlying
one's value choices, and then apply it openly and honestly to the
proposals at hand.
But that approach has grown unfashionable. Nowadays, far
too much legislation is opposed not on its merits-through debate
over its morality or the effect it would likely have in the real world,
and whether that effect is desirable or not-but because of pur-
ported constitutional defects. All of us constitutional theorists do
it, and so do the legions of activists who rely on our work. Consti-
tutional law is too often reduced to no more than an instrument to
be employed in pursuit of political goals. And if law (especially
constitutional law) really is no more than the pursuit of politics by
other means, then those critics are correct who insist that law is
empty at its core. 7
My faith as a scholar is that the critics are wrong, that consti-
tutional argument is both sensible and necessary. But if the Con-
stitution is more than an instrument to be manipulated, it cannot
possibly be the case that everything that is unpopular, even among
well-educated elites, is unconstitutional. One of the virtues of liv-
ing under a constitutional regime is (or ought to be) the possibility
that one can make distinct moral and legal arguments, that some
things may be constitutionally permissible even though morally re-
pugnant, whereas others may be constitutionally forbidden even
though morally required.8 8 If we persist in burying arguments over
policy under an avalanche of constitutional jargon, then those who
want to speak most closely to the point-whether the proposed
legislation is good or bad-will essentially be denied a hearing. The
explicitly moral appeals that have the capacity to raise the level of
our public debate will be drowned out by charges of unconstitu-
tionality and fanaticism.
87 Typical of the arguments that law is all politics, without coherent structure, are
those made by Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv.
205 (1979), Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in Law, in THE POLMCS OF LAW 310 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982), and Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561
(1983).
" For a recent and detailed elaboration of this point, see Schauer, An Essay on Consti-
tutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797, 812-21 (1982). See also infra note 94 (citing some
recent attempts to join normative moral and positive constitutional discourse).
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Classical liberalism, as reflected in the American democratic
tradition, is premised on the inevitability of social progress, the vi-
tality of process, and the general (although not absolute) distinc-
tion between the legitimacy of a process and the morality of the
policies that it produces over the short term. A liberal system may
provide a means-for us, judicial review-for invalidating some re-
sults of the process. But, by and large, a liberal system will channel
public dialogue toward the morality of those results, not the moral-
ity of the process itself, unless the process over time fails to reflect
the popular will. If the judges whose task it is to measure the re-
sults of the process against a higher law-for us, the Constitu-
tion-are free to check the process as they choose, to substitute
their own view of what the law ought to be for their judgment on
what the law is, then those judges, not the process, are producing
the rules.89 The process, in short, has become irrelevant, and in a
way that virtually forecloses public dialogue on the morality of the
rules that result. In such a society, there may yet be social pro-
gress, but it is no longer liberal democratic progress.
To protect the vitality of process and the role of public dia-
logue, the rules of liberal adjudication-the rules on which judicial
review is popularly and perhaps necessarily defended-require
clear interpretive principles to constrain adjudication.0 The prin-
ciple applied in deciding any case must not be selected specially to
bring about a desired result, but rather should be derived at a level
of generality detached from the needs of the case at hand. This
facet of liberal adjudication is captured in Herbert Wechsler's evo-
cation of "neutral principles."91 The requirement is not that the
principle itself be neutral (presumably "neutral principle," if the
adjective modifies the noun, is an oxymoron); nor that the process
89 This proposition has always been central to American constitutional theory. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANOEROUS
BRANCH (1962). Indeed, it is arguably necessary for all of law. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW (1961) (arguing that "rules of recognition" can serve to distinguish law from mere
power).
g' To say that interpretation should be constrained is by no means to say that it ought
to be somehow objective-a goal which, even if desirable (which it may not be), sounds very
much like a contradiction in terms. See Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERPRETATION 249 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983); Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Wal-
ter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk About Objectivity Any More, in id. at 287. Rather,
"[t]he role of judicial objectivity can best be appreciated ... by seeing constraint by objec-
tive sources as itself something valued by courts-as one ingredient in a complex mixture of
values." Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 478 (1984); see
also Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982
(1978).
" See Wechsler, supra note 40.
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through which the principle is created be neutral (in the sense that
none of the creators care what the principle is); but rather that the
act of applying the principle to the case at hand be neutral (in the
sense that the principle is not altered because the judge does not
like the outcome)., 2
This definitional proposition assumes enormous significance in
the debate over the consistency of judicial review with liberal dem-
ocratic theory. A recurring theme in liberal legal discourse93 is the
effort to justify much of law based on the process that produced it,
while dismissing some properly processed law as immoral, thus un-
just, and consequently unenforceable. The effort to show that
these dismissals constitute something more than the enforcement
of judicial preferences has inspired a major portion of contempo-
rary scholarship on constitutional theory.9 4 The effort to show that
they do not has been a centerpiece of the attacks from both the
left and the right.9 5 Pending the resolution of this controversy,
most observers would probably concede that many of the Court's
most lauded decisions-decisions that endorse claims of individual
rights by striking down some properly processed law-are sup-
ported by reasoning charitably described as obscure.
Perhaps in the short run our legal system and the political sys-
tem of which it forms a part can survive the application of non-
neutral constitutional principles in the evolution of a jurisprudence
of rights. Arguments over the Morgan power, however, are
92 For the debate as to the meaning of neutrality, compare Wechsler, supra note 40,
with Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
Critics of liberal theories of constitutional adjudication may also take the principle of neu-
trality as an axiom of the legal system, albeit the system to be deconstructed. See, e.g.,
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985);
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Princi-
ples, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983).
" Although my constitutional discussion is limited to what might be called liberal posi-
tivist theories, by which I mean those that build on the case law, the privacy right found in
Roe v. Wade might be supported or opposed-and the Human Life Bill therefore opposed
or supported-on arguments that are intended in some sense to transcend, or perhaps re-
fute, conventional liberal legal analysis. Into this category I would place both the feminist
jurisprudence supporting abortion rights, see, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 22, and the es-
sentially religious jurisprudence opposing them, see, e.g., STEPHEN KRASON, ABORTION:
PoLrrxCs, MORALITY, AND THE CONSTrrUTION 349-92 (1984) (arguing for fetal protection be-
cause the fetus possesses a soul).
" See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); R, DwoR-
KIN, supra note 85; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
95 Attacks from the left I discuss in the various footnotes to this section. Attacks from
the right include, for example, RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bork,
supra note 92; Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1361 (1979); Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tx. L. REV. 693 (1976).
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sketched not in the subtle and ambiguous pastels of arguments
over individual rights, but in the bold, bright colors of separation
of powers and checks and balances and the need to preserve the
integrity of judicial review. These are all principles of governmen-
tal structure, and as such form the bedrock on which the rest of
the constitutional system, including the rights of individuals, is
built. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, permitting normative
positions to influence the selection of structural constitutional
rules will over time prove far more subversive of the rule of law
than doing the same with respect to individual rights.96 The indi-
vidual rights clauses are drawn so broadly as to beg to be filled
with content from some extra-constitutional source. The clauses
establishing the structure of the government, by contrast, tend to
reflect a concrete understanding about the way in which the insti-
tutions they create were to interact. In part this is an argument
that many of the constitutional provisions setting forth govern-
mental structure are on the whole more determinate than are other
parts of the Constitution. In part it is an argument that the courts
should choose interpretive rules tending to render them so. 98 It is
difficult-I would say well-nigh impossible-to defend the legiti-
macy of governance under a system in which no rules are relatively
determinate, not even those constituting the system itself. The
rules that constitute the system are the rules that create the courts
and delineate their function. In interpreting those rules, the judge
is both referee and player.9 9 A judge playing those dual roles
should be self-conscious in her effort to narrow the scope of her
own discretion. 100 Whatever the weaknesses or overindulgences of
the Critical Legal Studies' assault on contemporary constitutional
theory, there is at the core a proposition that seems to me unex-
O See Carter, Indeterminate Text, supra note 8, at 853-65.
' The individual rights clauses often "ha[ve] a distinctly different rhythm and feel,"
speaking as they do "in terms more lofty, general, and open-ended," so that "[fjaithfulness
to the text itself seems to invite a higher level of interpretive generality and a different
mode of legal analysis." Amar, supra note 16, at 258 n.169; see also A. BicKL, supra note
89, at 104-05; Carter, Indeterminate Text, supra note 8, at 849-52. To say this is not to
say-how I wish it were!-that I have up my sleeve some perfect means for cabining judicial
review under the open-ended and relatively indeterminate fundamental rights clauses.
9" A moderate form of originalism and a faithfulness to the text are among the herme-
neutical methods I have in mind, not because they will lead to perfect justice, but rather
because they are the most likely to be effective limits on the ability of judges to read their
own values into every decision. But see Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong An-
swers: A Reply to Professor Carter, 66 B.U.L. Rav. (forthcoming).
9 See Carter, Judicial Power, supra note 27, at 1367.
"o See Carter, Indeterminate Text, supra note 8, at 853-72 (relating this argument to
the effort to justify liberal conceptions of judicial review).
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ceptionable: If even the structure of government is generally inde-
terminate and malleable as judges change their minds, then most
of what we call constitutional law is simply judicially created pol-
icy, and the claim for a rule of constitutional law is a rather nasty
joke.101
Opponents of the Human Life Bill who assail it as a violation
of the separation of powers, but who want nevertheless to preserve
the result in Katzenbach v. Morgan, must be prepared to buttress
their constitutional arguments with supporting principles that do
not rely for their force on whether the person applying them
thinks Roe v. Wade was rightly or wrongly decided. If the Human
Life Bill is challenged on separation of powers grounds-grounds
derived from the constitutional structure of government-then the
distinction between the Bill and section 4(e) cannot, under the
rules of liberal adjudication, rest ultimately on the pro-choice
predilections of a majority of the Justices. If one is desirable and
the other is not and the reason is that one protects something the
critic likes and the other does not, then the rule is neither as deter-
minate nor as neutral as the academic critics of the Human Life
Bill would have members of the Congress believe. If the distin-
guishing rule does indeed require hostility toward efforts at ban-
ning abortion, then it is not a rule about the separation of powers.
This is the reason I suggested at the beginning of this section
that the separation of powers is a poorly chosen battleground for
this controversy. Perhaps the parties should fight instead over the
real issue between them: Whether abortion should remain a matter
for private choice. Thus, saving Morgan-and saving classical con-
cepts of constitutional adjudication-requires stepping back from
the bold separation of powers arguments usually offered to distin-
guish section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act from the proposal for a
'1o See id. at 829-30. Constitutional theorists (or perhaps they are better described as
anti-theorists) associated with the Conference on Critical Legal Studies press the more gen-
eralized argument that any indeterminacy of constitutional rules threatens legitimacy of the
constitutional structure. See, e.g., Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Fu-
ture, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contribu-
tions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). But liberal
theory may be able to survive this critique, in part because relatively determinate structural
provisions can help justify relatively indeterminate rules for construing provisions on indi-
vidual rights. See Carter, Indeterminate Text, supra note 8.
Mark Tushnet has pressed the argument that the clauses that establish the structure of
the federal government may not be fairly described as even relatively determinate. See
Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
683 (1985). Even if he is correct that it is possible to imagine an interpretation of a clause
apart from the obvious one, it is not necessarily the case that the courts cannot or should
not select interpretive rules rendering the structural clauses relatively determinate.
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Human Life Bill, thereby gaining a perspective sufficient to con-
sider the matter from a different angle. It requires as well a will-
ingness on the part of the defenders of section 4(e) who are also
opponents of the Human Life Bill to shift their ground, openly to
argue right and wrong, rather than to disguise moral preference as
constitutional law. Following the back step, following the shift, it
should be possible to reconstruct the Morgan power in a way more
consistent with both the liberal democratic value of public dialogue
and the separation of powers that underlies our constitutional
system.
IV. THE Morgan POWER AS LIBERAL IDEAL
A. Morgan as Dialogue
The spirit of a decided case involves much more than the
Court's reasoning, and the spirit of Katzenbach v. Morgan involves
much more than the meaning of Justice Brennan's limiting foot-
note. Whatever the other lessons of legal realism, one aspect of its
teaching is clear: A court's stated explanation for its decision does
not necessarily capture the reasoning process the court has actually
undertaken. Similarly, the reasons Morgan was rightly decided
may have only the most tenuous connection with the reasons ar-
ticulated by the majority.
Some years ago, Alexander Bickel described an "endlessly re-
newed educational conversation" between the Justices of the Su-
preme Court and the public that must decide whether to obey
their edicts, concluding with the admonition that "it is a conversa-
tion, not a monologue. '102 In Professor Bickel's vision, the Court's
many constituents, including the public and the Congress, respond
by words and actions to the Court's decisions-and the Court must
listen to the response. 103 The Justices do not necessarily reverse
themselves when their decisions are unpopular' 04 -no functioning
guardian of fundamental rights could justifiably do so. But they
are certainly aware of opposition when it exists.
102 ALFXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 111 (1975). For an effort to describe
the political philosophy underlying Bickel's work, see Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philoso-
phy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
103 Cf. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 516 (1982) ("It is
a wise court that pays attention to the community-not out of fear, but out of obligation.").
I would emphasize, however, that an obligation to listen hardly translates into an obligation
to concur.
101 See S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 229-68
(1st ed. 1971).
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A dialogic theory of this kind may be the key to understanding
the Morgan power. Writing several- years after Professor Bickel
did, when the Congress was showing signs that it would make more
use of the Morgan power, Robert Burt made a similar suggestion
about the scope of and the justification for congressional authority
under section 5. The Supreme Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
Professor Burt suggested, did not really define a power to override
the Court's decisions, but rather offered an invitation to poke
about the margins, to work "around the edges" of the doctrines
proclaimed by the Court.105 The Court, in Professor Burt's theory,
would issue the broad pronouncements; the details of application
could be worked out in "an ordered dialogue between Court and
Congress." 10 6 In this way, society could progress without leaving to
the Court the unpalatable and politically risky task of dealing with
the minutiae of transforming its judgments into working policy. 10 7
The theory set out by Professor Burt is quite appealing, be-
cause instead of relying on any highly formalistic vision of separa-
tion of powers and neutral principles, it envisions a continuing pro-
cess through which the Court and the Congress "speak" to one
another. But his theory makes too little of what the Court permit-
ted in Katzenbach v. Morgan. That case involved no mere
marginal adjustment in the content of previously declared rights.
It was, and should be admitted to have been, a flat congressional
override of what the Court had previously announced as constitu-
tional law. Nevertheless, Professor Burt's dialogic view of Morgan
may possess a healthy degree of explanatory power, once it is freed
from the arbitrary limitation that the dialogue is joined only at the
margins.
The missing dimension is supplied by returning to Professor
Bickel's original vision of the dialogue. The role of the Supreme
Court in that vision is not merely to monitor the legislature's tink-
ering with its decisions, but to pay attention to the depth of oppo-
sition as well. Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act fits this model
more easily than it does any of the complicated separation of pow-
ers theories that are usually advanced to justify Morgan and limit
its scope. The literacy test prohibitions did more than simply en-
gage the Justices in debate: They announced a congressional judg-
105 Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganitic Marriage, 1969 S. CT. REv. 81, 129-34.
Others have also suggested that the Morgan power is most usefully considered as applicable
only at the margins, not at the core. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 29, at 1239-40.
" Burt, supra note 105, at 134.
107 Id. at 132-34.
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ment that the Court was simply wrong. Whether the judgment was
one about law or fact or morality is quite beside the point; the
Congress wanted literacy tests to go and was quite willing to say so
through affirmative legislation. Absent that legislation, there would
have been no Katzenbach v. Morgan and thus no debate.
The Human Life Bill fits the same model. Some of the Bill's
proponents insist that they do not really believe that the Congress
possesses the authority to reverse Roe v. Wade by affirmative legis-
lation. In fact, they may even concede that under some reasonable
readings of Roe the proposed Human Life Bill is unconstitutional
on its face. 108 They nevertheless support the bill for what they call
its symbolic value: It represents an opportunity to put the Court
on notice that the Congress of the United States, as a separate, co-
equal, and much more representative body, considers abortion the
killing of a human being and Roe v. Wade therefore wrongly de-
cided.110 In so doing, the proponents explain, they seek to engage
the Justices in a conversation, to force the Court to acknowledge,
even when striking down the bill, that it is acting in the face of
growing national opposition. 1 0 In short, the proponents of the
Human Life Bill may implicitly be endorsing a dialogic interpreta-
tion of Morgan: They want to offer the Court a chance and a rea-
son to overrule Roe."'
The literature generally dismisses this argument out of hand.
Samuel Estreicher, one of the most articulate critics of the Human
Life Bill, points out that the proposed bill represents far more
than a "mere declaration" of congressional opinion: Its supporters
envision enforcement of the Human Life Bill through the adminis-
10 I take this to be conceded in Stephen Galebach's testimony in support of the Bill.
See Hearings, supra note 13, at 200.
109 See, e.g., id. at 278 (statement of William Van Alstyne) (suggesting that the Bill "is
frankly a stalking horse ... to dramatize the depth of private feeling that attended the
decision in Roe v. Wade" and that it is appropriate for Congress to "use the newsworthiness
of proposed but futile . . . legislation for such advertising purposes"); id. at 925 (prepared
statement of Rep. Henry Hyde) ("I see nothing wrong and much right about passing a
Human Life Bill and giving the Court an opportunity to reconsider Roe v. Wade," even if
the legislation is deemed unconstitutional).
120 See id. at 200 (statement of Stephen Galebach).
Il Although Michael Perry once proposed a similar dialogic model of the relationship
between the Court and the Congress, he overlooked the possibility that the Congress might
play its part in the dialogue by enacting an arguably unconstitutional statute, concluding
instead that "[s]uch a change in the relationship between Congress and the Court would
tend to undermine the very inter-institutional tension-the dialectic interplay between
Court and Congress-that is the reason to value noninterpretive review in the first place."
M. PERRY, supra note 18, at 135-36.
1986]
The University of Chicago Law Review [53:819
tration of restrictions on the practice of abortion." 2 Thus, he con-
cludes, the bill's supporters "must be claiming that without the
Court's cooperation, Congress has authority to authorize restrictive
regulation of abortion.""'  In other words, the claim that the bill
forms part of a dialogue with the Court is simply a sham."4
But this criticism is somewhat wide of the mark. Naturally the
proponents of the Human Life Bill envision doing all in their
power to prevent abortion; that is what motivates their support. If,
however, the Court is to be engaged in a dialogue, it must be
presented with a real case or controversy. What Professor Es-
treicher would apparently prefer-a declaration that the Congress
believes that human life begins at conception, devoid of enforce-
ment apparatus-probably would raise no justiciable issues be-
cause it would injure no one. As advocates for the mentally dis-
abled learned in the Pennhurst case, a congressional effort to
legislate through imprecation is nothing more than a statement of
opinion, and a wholly ineffective statement of opinion is a form of
opposition the Justices can easily ignore." 5 In a continuing dia-
logue between the Congress and the Court, the form in which the
112 Estreicher, supra note 17, at 346 & n.28.
113 Id. at 346.
114 Another version of the "sham" argument has been pressed by my colleague Lea
Brilmayer, who contended in written testimony opposing the Human Life Bill that the pro-
posal seeks to authorize the states to do what the Congess itself could not constitutionally
do-ban all or most abortions-and that no Supreme Court decision has ever authorized the
Congress to act in that fashion. See Brilmayer, The Human Life Bill, the Bill of Rights, and
the Congressional Enforcement Power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
Appendix to Hearings, supra note 17, at 793; see also Hearings, supra note 13, at 248-50
(prepared statement of Laurence Tribe) (similar argument). Professor Sager made a similar
point long before anyone suspected that a Human Life Bill was afoot. See Sager, supra note
29, at 1240 (arguing that the Morgan power cannot authorize the states to do anything that
the Court would forbid).
None of this, however, weighs adequately the peculiar nature of the majority opinion in
Roe and, in particular, the seeming judicial invitation to the political branches to search for
consensus on when life begins. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text. If the sup-
porters of the Human Life Bill are right to read Roe as they do-and certainly their argu-
ment is not frivolous-then the Bill does not authorize the states to do what the Congress
could not. On their reading of Roe and Morgan, the Congress could, given proper factual
determinations, enact legislation directly restricting the exercise of the rights found in Roe.
In other words, according to its proponents, the Bill would authorize the states to do no
more than the Congress itself may do.
'" See Pennhurst State School & Hasp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that
congressionally approved "bill of rights" for the mentally disabled creates no substantive
rights). A dialogical view of the relationship between Congress and the Court might have led
to a different result. See Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93
YALE L.J. 455, 497 (1984) ("Even accepting the premise that congressional intent was un-
clear here, the Court should have welcomed and reached out to find Congress's constitu-
tional interpretive authority in this matter.").
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opposition makes itself manifest may matter a great deal; some
forms are more easily ignored because they are more easily con-
trived. But the dialogue envisioned by the proponents of the
Human Life Bill is one in which each side uses all the resources at
its disposal. 116
The force with which the American people (and just as impor-
tant, those who govern them) are socialized into obedience to the
rule of law as articulated by the Supreme Court is tremendous.
Children are taught obedience to law from early in their school
years; as adolescents, they learn in civics that the Supreme Court
authoritatively interprets the Constitution; as adults, they are
warned that disobedience to the courts is subversive. This general
respect for law, even if the law is considered unjust, is probably the
most powerful bulwark the American legal and political culture of-
fers against revolution. This socialization and the concomitant re-
sponsibilities it surely carries are the most powerful weapons the
Court can bring to bear in any struggle with the Congress. Al-
though the public may be angry, the Justices, if they possess suffi-
cient fortitude, will nearly always win-at least for the near term.
But the fact that the Congress is likely to lose its battle to
convince the Court (if it is a fact) cannot be the argument against
undertaking it. The point is that by enacting a statute that the
Supreme Court will likely find patently unconstitutional, the Con-
gress may nevertheless play a role in constitutional dialogue. This
is surely what Abraham Lincoln had in mind when, in debate with
Stephen Douglas, he declined to assign to the Dred Scott deci-
sion ' 7 the force some claimed for it:
We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to
be a slave by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be
free.. . . [W]e nevertheless do oppose that decision as a polit-
ical rule'. . . which shall be binding on the members of Con-
gress or the President to favor no measure that does not actu-
Ile To better understand why the mere adoption of a congressional resolution of disa-
greement would not be an adequate substitute for affirmative legislation of this nature, it
might be useful to imagine a member of Congress who has voted in favor of a nonbinding
resolution urging the overturning of Roe. The representative goes home to her district and
explains to a pro-life group, "I strongly oppose abortion, of course, but this was all I could
do, because the Court has ruled." She then goes across the street and tells a pro-choice
group, "Although I am personally opposed to abortion, I pledge that I will not vote in favor
of any unconstitutional efforts to circumvent the decision." If the Congress risks nothing
because it does nothing, then the dialogue is not really joined in the way that it is when
members of Congress take the risk, go out on the limb, and adopt the affirmative legislation.
117 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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ally concur with the principles of that decision. . . . We
propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a
new judicial rule established upon this subject.118
His argument was not for mob justice or revolution. His method,
after all, would not succeed unless the Justices changed their
minds.
Thus the torturous judicial and academic searches for author-
ity to explain and rules to limit the scope of the congressional au-
thority enunciated in Katzenbach v. Morgan may be somewhat
misguided. After all, a sufficiently determined Supreme Court
might have countered section 4(e) with an opinion boiling down to
this: "Look, we told you before that literacy tests do not violate
the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments, so quit trying to find a
way around our decision." Instead it said in effect: "Well, okay, if
you're really sure that literacy tests are so bad, we're content to go
along." Oregon v. Mitchell,119 in which the Justices sustained the
nationwide suspension of literacy tests, might be explained the
same way. To take a contrary case, in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan,120 wherein they rejected a claim that the Con-
gress possessed and had exercised authority under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment to permit the states to operate single-sex
nursing schools, the Justices were plainly unpersuaded that sexu-
ally segregated schools run by the state were a good thing.
Following the same reasoning, in the unlikely event that the
Congress were to enact a Human Life Bill, judicial independence
would not necessarily be threatened: The Justices could certainly
strike the legislation as patently unconstitutional. On the other
hand, the Justices might vote to sustain it. Were they to do so, the
best explanation would be not that they had yielded their constitu-
tional prerogative, but rather that they had been convinced by the
reasoning (or the depth) of the congressional opposition.
If all of this is so, then the place of the Morgan power in the
dialogue between the Court and its constituents should be plain. I
earlier outlined the ideal of symbiotic progress, in which the Con-
gress and the Supreme Court take turns leading the way toward a
better future. An exercise of the Morgan power may fit into that
progression in a special way, as the Congress's most effective tool
for expressing its strong disapproval of a judicial decision ac-
118 POLITICAL DEBATES BETWEEN ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 299
(1895) (Lincoln's speech of Oct. 13, 1858, at Quincy, Illinois).
19 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
,2 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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cepting or rejecting a claim of fundamental right without risking
the Court's legitimacy, hence the Constitution's, hence ultimately
its own.
To be sure, the Congress might try to do the same thing by
enacting apparently unconstitutional legislation under the author-
ity granted by any number of constitutional provisions, but pro-
ceeding under section 5 reduces the likelihood that the moral au-
thority of the Court will be diminished should the Justices alter
their decisions. As clever lawyers, the Justices can always accom-
modate the congressional action without unduly expanding con-
gressional authority. Justice Brennan tried to do exactly this
through his footnote 10 in Morgan. Furthermore, reliance on the
special power granted to the Congress under the fourteenth
amendment is consistent with the distinction I have drawn here
and elsewhere between types of constitutional provisions. When
the decision that the Congress calls into question is one regarding
governmental structure, flowing therefore from the document's
structural provisions, the Court may properly decline to enter the
dialogue. By hypothesis, the Justices construe the Constitution's
structural clauses under a set of rules chosen to channel their dis-
cretion narrowly. But under the open-textured clauses, where there
is less to guide the Court in its decisions, it is particularly impor-
tant that the Congress be able to engage the Court in dialogue
without being accused of defiance. The Court may reaffirm its deci-
sions, and in most cases-including, I suspect, Roe v. Wade-it
presumably will, but it must do so with the knowledge that there
exists a congressional consensus adequate to bring about affirma-
tive and contrary legislation. Denying to the Congress the author-
ity to enact the legislation is in a sense to deny to the Justices the
knowledge that this contrary consensus exists. Permitting the leg-
islation, even when it might subsequently be overturned, forces the
Court to make an informed choice. And in the continuing dialogue,
informed choices are the ones that matter most.
This understanding of the Morgan power seems entirely con-
sistent with the separation of powers. There is no violation of the
rule of United States v. Klein, 2' because the Congress is not re-
quiring the courts to decide cases in a particular way. After all, the
Supreme Court still has the power to say "No," thus preventing
enforcement of the congressional plan. No matter how many plans
are presented, the Court may strike all of them down until the
21 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
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Congress gets tired of trying, as Texas apparently did in the "white
primary" cases. 122 Or the Justices may instead be the first to tire
and may reverse themselves, as they apparently did during the
New Deal.123 But as long as the decision rests with the Justices
alone, a judicial change of mind cannot be barred by separation of
powers, even when the change is brought on by congressional or
public pressure. The doctrine of separation of powers insulates the
courts from force, not from persuasion.
I have argued elsewhere that the checks and balances should
be viewed as a dynamic system, one in which all the branches, in-
cluding the judicial branch, struggle for recognition, for authority,
and perhaps for victory as well.1 24 1 have stressed the need to limit
the ability of each branch to create what might be called "fresh
checks," methods of controlling the other branches that were not
apparently in the contemplation of those who designed the sys-
tem. 25 But the Morgan power that I have described certainly is no
fresh check. On the contrary, the exercise of the power involves
ordinary legislation-the object the Constitution most plainly em-
powers the Congress to undertake-and legislation under a clause,
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, that plainly contemplates
a special congressional role.126 Legislation, or attempts at legisla-
tion, are surely the most important weapons the Congress can
bring to bear in this continuing battle to check and balance. In
fact, if the Congress can never propose apparently unconstitutional
legislation, it is difficult to see how the Court will ever have the
opportunity to overrule a decision the Justices later decide was un-
wise.127 In a dynamic system, the overruling of a past decision may
be taken to mean that the Justices have chosen to back down. In
an ultimately political struggle, however, there is no reason that
one branch-even one as popular among legal scholars as the judi-
222 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (striking down Texas statute); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658-61 (1944) (reciting Texas's efforts to resist the Court's decision).
123 See C. BLACK, supra note 1, at 60.
124 See Carter, Judicial Power, supra note 27, at 1372-84; Carter, The Constitutional-
ity of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REv. 101, 112-16 (1984).
125 See Carter, Indeterminate Text, supra note 8, at 862-63; Carter, Judicial Power,
supra note 27, at 1364-72, 1394-99.
126 Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, like the enforcement clauses of the thir-
teenth, fifteenth, nineteenth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-sixth amendments,
grants to the Congress an explicit power to enforce the Constitution itself. The more com-
mon grants of authority-specifically, those listed in article I, section 8-do enable the Con-
gress to act, but not in furtherance of protecting rights that the Constitution itself might be
said to hold dear.
127 See RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 194-97 (1969); Hart, Profes-
sor Crosskey and Judicial Review (Book Review), 67 HARV. L. REv. 1456, 1457-58 (1954).
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ciary-must always be the winner.128
B. Implications of the Dialogue: The Morgan Opportunity
Viewed in the way that I have described it, as the chance to
force the Justices to rethink what they have done, the Morgan
"power" is probably misnamed; Professor Burt has said that we
should think of it as the Morgan "invitation.' 29 If an invitation
was extended, however, the invitation came from the Congress, not
from the Court, and the decision in Morgan was the Court's signal
that the invitation will sometimes be accepted. In this sense, Mor-
gan involved less a power or a conscious invitation than it did an
opportunity-the opportunity for the Supreme Court to reconsider
its approach in resolving a difficult societal problem.
The congressional invitation, the judicial opportunity, is
brought into existence only when the Congress enacts legislation
that seems to fly in the face of the Court's precedents. But con-
gressional action of that kind hardly represents the exercise of
some special "power." The Congress always possesses the raw
power to enact an unconstitutional law in the very formal sense
that if a majority of its members vote "Yes," then the statute will
go on the books, even though it might never be enforced and would
probably be struck down. To describe that as an exercise of a legis-
lative power, however, is to play a game with words. "The Congress
has the power to do X" in contemporary constitutional dialogue
means "the Congress acts constitutionally when it does X." Sec-
tion 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act became constitutional only be-
cause the Supreme Court took advantage of the opportunity of-
fered it by the Congress to overrule, albeit silently, the essence of
Lassiter. Similarly, proponents of the Human Life Bill want to of-
fer the Justices the opportunity to overrule, even silently, the es-
sence of Roe. If judicial acceptance of the offer seems unlikely, the
prediction simply serves as additional evidence that the word
"power" is, in this context, misused: There is no Morgan power.
The implication of the Morgan opportunity, as it should thus
be called, is that members of the Congress ought sometimes to vote
in favor of statutes they believe will not stand up under judicial
scrutiny. In a political culture dominated by law, the argument
123 This dialogic conception is discussed in greater detail in Carter, The Right Ques-
tions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning, 66 B.U.L. REv. (forthcoming).
"' See Burt, supra note 105, at 81, 113-14. Irving Gordon has suggested a similar met-
aphor to illuminate the relationship between the Court and the Congress. See Gordon,
supra note 49, at 704-05.
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"The courts would declare this statute unconstitutional" carries
substantial weight in congressional debate prior to a bill's passage.
This is as it should be, for a Congress determined always to ignore
the will of the courts would, in American terms, be a lawless one.
But that is not the same as saying that whenever a member of that
Congress decides to vote her conscience rather than her prediction
of what a court would do, the fabric of American society is
threatened. 130 Only a fanatic would try to defy every court decision
contrary to some individual constellation of values, but most of us
do (and all of us should) have some values we hold so dear that the
fact that "process" has produced a contrary result will not long
detain us. True, the effort to shape these values into policy in defi-
ance of legal institutions often leads to reaction or revolution, but
in a society which, as ours should, emphasizes change and evolu-
tion, that effort is far more likely to lead to progress-as it did in
Katzenbach v. Morgan.
Whether the enactment of the Human Life Bill would also
lead to social progress is a matter that cannot be decided by legal
analysis, but only through each individual's search of his or her
own values. A negative answer to that inquiry, however, hardly dic-
tates the conclusion that the Bill must therefore be unconstitu-
tional. Just as some of the Bill's opponents have concluded that
abortion is wrong but the legislation is nevertheless unconstitu-
tional, it is possible to conclude that abortion is best left to indi-
vidual choice but that the Bill does not violate the separation of
powers. Unfortunately, in American political culture, opinions on
the constitutional merits of a proposal are frequently mistaken
for-or translated into-views on its wisdom or folly.
Too often in our political dialogue, we speak as though the
Constitution and the decisions explicating it constitute the whole
of public morality. This is a dangerous view, because it gives falli-
ble (sometimes pernicious) institutions an undeserved centrality in
the moral universe. Liberal political theory demands no such con-
clusion. Rules are not good rules merely because they accord with
authority, and proposed rules are not bad ones merely because au-
iS0 For different positions on this issue, see Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's
Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975) (suggesting that a
proper understanding of the significance of prior judicial actions should guide voting in the
legislature); Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REv.
707 (1985) (members of Congress have sufficient staff to enable them to make independent
constitutional assessments); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUm L. REv.
1001, 1008 (1965) (a state legislature may offer an unconstitutional statute, but should even-
tually accede to the Court's insistence on its unconstitutionality).
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thority disagrees. Yet in America, liberalism, with its focus on the
rule of law, has come to shy away from public moral discourse. At
least in part as a result, the United States lacks a coherent tradi-
tion of public morality, and people who insist on discussing moral-
ity (which in much of the Western world is central to any debate
over public policy) are often dismissed as dangerous fanatics.
These developments have contributed to an unfortunate facet
of the modern legislative processes. Every controversial proposal
generates legions of scholars to testify on whether it does or does
not conform to past judicial decisions. Yet if public debate ignores
questions of morality (or grants those questions only a subordinate
status), then real individuals with views on the wisdom or folly of
the proposal are reduced to the status of nonautonomous
agents-a status that liberalism rightly condemns. When immoral
legislation is proposed, its opponents do a disservice to public dis-
course-and to their own cause-when they couch their moral ar-
guments as constitutional ones. The Right has in recent years been
quicker than the Left to recognize that in the battle for public
opinion, when one side argues morality and the other argues con-
stitutional law, the, side with only the Constitution to offer finds
itself with the more difficult struggle.
That opponents of the Human Life Bill resist the invitation to
moral discourse might suggest a fear of being bested, but it is
hardly the case that no nonconstitutional arguments against the
Bill are available. Even one who is troubled by an unencumbered
right to obtain an abortion might pause and consider why the Con-
gress should place on a woman who is pregnant a greater burden to
support another life than we place on others in society. 31 The de-
bate over abortion, however, is frequently carried on as though fe-
tal personhood is the only dispositive issue, as though it really is
self-evident-as the Roe majority seemed to think-that the right
to end a pregnancy could not co-exist with a belief in fetal human-
ity. Yet one could simultaneously accept that the fetus is a human
being and that the state ought not force a woman to carry it.132
Even if the critic of Roe is unconvinced by any of this, there re-
SI See Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Du-
ties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330, 337-38 (1985); Regan, supra
note 67.
132 See Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PENN. L. REV. 955, 1021
(1984); Thomson, supra note 67; cf. Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J.
599, 608-09 (1986) (suggesting that forced medical treatment of a pregnant woman in the
interest of protecting fetal life might be harmful to the well-being of the woman).
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mains all the slippery slope problems attendant on a definition of a
fetus as a human being, problems only partly captured by the im-
age of prosecuting as child abusers women who smoke or use drugs
during pregnancy.133 The point of this is not that these arguments
would necessarily convince; only that these, and others like them,
are available to those who oppose the Bill and are at least as
weighty as the somewhat shaky constitutional case. If opponents of
the Human Life Bill and similar proposals prefer to make the con-
stitutional argument instead, they will inevitably face suspicion
that they are simply afraid of moral debate. That is why the pro-
choice forces ought not to neglect the argument that congressional
action to restrict abortion might be wrong not because it is uncon-
stitutional but because it is immoral.134
CONCLUSION
"The crucial point," Professor Bickel argued in The Morality
of Consent, "is that we engage in a contest of wills."1 35 In Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, the congressional will was sufficiently strong that
the Court was persuaded to abandon its own stated position. In the
next case, especially if it involves the Human Life Bill, the contest
might be decided the other way. But as long as the Morgan oppor-
tunity exists, the contest-and the dialogue that underlies it-will
(and should) go on.
The Human Life Bill, in short, might be a poor idea and
might, if enacted, be declared unconstitutional by the courts.
Those characteristics do not necessarily differentiate it from the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. The instinct that the two are different
surely stems from an instinct about the Court-that the Justices
are far more determined to preserve the right of a pregnant woman
to decide whether to proceed with her pregnancy than they ever
were determined to preserve the authority of a state to bar Miter-
133 Cf. Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Inju-
ries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325 (1984). For a comprehensive listing
of other obstacles that await down the slippery slope, see Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The
Potential Reach of a Human Life Amendment, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE:, supra note 76, at
174.
134 Not all opponents of the Human Life Bill have sidestepped moral argument. For
example, Judy Collins, testifying in opposition to the Human Life Bill, eschewed legal argu-
ment, presenting instead the views of many who had been involved in one way or another
with decisions about and performances of abortions. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 974-95.
She obviously is not a constitutional scholar, but those who are do not necessarily possess
special expertise if, as I suggest, the potential constitutional infirmities of the legislation are
not by themselves sufficient reason (and cannot possibly be the best reason) to defeat it.
135 A- BICKEL, supra note 102, at 111.
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ate voters from the franchise. The distinction, in other words,
stems from a reading of the minds of the Justices, not from an
interpretation of the lines of the text, and the statement that the
Human Life Bill is patently unconstitutional is little more than a
prediction-or a plea-that the Justices would find it so.136
Predictions-and pleas, too-play a crucial role in the contin-
uing dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court; so do the
other efforts by Congress to change the Court's mind. Katzenbach
v. Morgan may best be read as no more than an implicit judicial
acknowledgment of the truth of both these propositions.
136 In the end, then, we get back to Holmes, and perhaps the most important of his
many aphorisms: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pre-
tentious, are what I mean by the law." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COL-
LECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173 (1920).
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